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Abstract 
Bioethanol represents an opportunity for Brazil to exert global leadership by 
substantially scaling up their production, consumption, and international trade. Africa 
represents an ideal venue in which to do this, given its suitable agro-climatic conditions 
and extensive land area. Brazil has consequently sought to establish bilateral 
partnerships with African countries, as well as North-South-South trilateral partnerships 
involving the EU and US. However, empirically grounded assessments of how Brazil’s 
leadership aspirations have unfolded in practice through these partnerships are limited. 
In this study, we examine Brazil’s potential to exert global political leadership, by 
analyzing its policy-based, structural, and instrumental qualities in making bilateral and 
trilateral inroads regarding bioethanol production in Africa. Interviews in Brazil, Africa, 
and Europe suggest that both the bilateral and trilateral avenues have produced meager 
results. Lack of domestic strategy and vision, economic recession, and a fragmented 
alliance network have reduced Brazil’s capacity to achieve its ethanol diplomacy 
objectives. We conclude that for Brazil to meet its leadership goals and reinvigorate 
Africa’s interest in biofuels, the reconsolidation of a domestic vision is a key first step. 
 
 
 
The rise of major emerging powers has elicited considerable debate, interest, and 
speculation in the field of global change. Brazil, India, and China are challenging the 
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traditional dominance of the Global North, seeking to capitalize on their newly acquired 
strategic assets by undertaking political initiatives aimed at reforming global 
governance (Hopewell 2015). The formation of the trade and financial G20s indicates 
their growing presence in key decision-making fora like the World Trade Organization, 
while their deal-brokering role during the 2009 Copenhagen climate conference 
signaled their emergence as pivotal actors in global environmental negotiations. Despite 
the proliferating literature on the implications of their growing status, empirical 
assessments of emerging powers’ leadership strengths and weaknesses within specific 
issue areas remain scarce. Although studies have focused on their leadership potential, 
either individually or collectively, in relation to the climate change regime (Hochstetler 
and Viola 2012; Papa and Gleason 2012), similar investigations are largely lacking with 
respect to biofuels, which is a policy area in which Brazil is often portrayed as a global 
leader. However, empirically grounded assessments of Brazil’s leadership are limited, a 
lacuna that this study aims to address. 
Brazil has a long tradition in biofuels, based on the production of first-generation 
ethanol using sugarcane as feedstock.1 Consequently, over time, Brazil has developed 
substantial technological and scientific expertise for this specific crop and production 
technology, which it has explicitly sought to diffuse abroad through technical knowledge 
transfer, exchange of best practices, and private-sector investment, otherwise known as 
“ethanol diplomacy.” For Brazilian policy-makers, transforming the country into a world 
leader in bioenergy and creating a global biofuels market are central political objectives 
(Dalgaard 2012). The prerequisite for biofuels to develop into a globally traded 
commodity is a market with a constellation of countries not only consuming, but also 
producing, biofuels (Dalgaard 2012). 
The African continent is vital to Brazil’s ambitions. First, climatic parameters are 
important for the growth of energy crops. Sugarcane is a tropical crop, so sugarcane-
based ethanol can only be produced in parts of Africa, Asia, and Latin America—that is, 
in countries located in tropical climatic zones similar to those of Brazil. Environmental 
similarities between the agro-climatic conditions in the African savannahs and the 
Brazilian cerrado therefore provide a familiar agro-ecological context, which has 
                                                          
1 Biofuels from food sources are collectively known as first-generation biofuels. Second-generation biofuels 
are produced from inedible sources, such as woody crops, energy grasses, or even agricultural and forestry 
residues, thereby avoiding competition with food production. 
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prompted Brazilian policy-makers to explore the replication of their sugarcane-ethanol 
model in Africa’s savannahs (Amorim 2010). This idea was the driving force behind 
ethanol diplomacy in Africa during the administration of President Lula, whose 
prevailing view at the time was that African countries could meet part of their energy 
needs by imitating Brazil’s experience, albeit at a lesser scale.2 
Second, geographical factors are pertinent, because Africa is perceived as 
endowed with vast tracts of land into which to expand biofuel production (Dalgaard 
2012; White 2013)—in contrast to, for example, Central American and Caribbean 
countries, whose limited land availability effectively rules out investments of more than 
20,000 hectares.3 Finally, Brazil and Africa share affinities due to Brazil’s close cultural, 
historical, and economic ties with a number of Lusophone African countries, such as 
Mozambique, Angola, and Cape Verde. Indeed, business, language, and the African roots 
of Brazilian black culture are considered key forces behind Brazil’s drive to deepen 
relations with the continent.4 
Several benefits would ideally accrue from increased growth of the global 
biofuels market. For Brazil, it would provide a leadership opportunity linked to 
increased visibility, strategic positioning in an emerging global market, and expansion 
opportunities for its commercial sector. Africa is envisaged to benefit through reduced 
oil dependency and foreign debt, as well as stimulation of rural development and 
enhanced economic activities (Favretto et al. 2013). Except for South Africa, ethanol 
production in the African countries with the greatest potential for sugarcane cultivation 
exceeds domestic demands for blending, thereby creating export opportunities 
(Johnson and Batidzirai 2012). 
This article applies a leadership theoretical framework, alongside empirical 
evidence, to evaluate Brazil’s quest to exert global leadership within the biofuels arena, 
focusing specifically on its bilateral and trilateral partnerships with Africa. It draws on 
secondary data from government documents, reports, and scientific studies, as well as 
on interviews with Brazilian, African, and EU stakeholders. Primary data were gathered 
through fifty-four semistructured interviews carried out across Brazil (March 2013, 
August–September 2014, and September 2015), EU headquarters (October 2013), and 
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3 Interview #25. 
4 Interview #5. 
4 
 
Africa (October 2013, July 2014, and May–June 2015) (see the Appendix for the full list). 
A purposive sample and snowballing approach were used to identify respondents. 
 
Insights from Theory on Leadership 
The literature on international cooperation emphasizes the decisive role of 
leadership for addressing transnational problems and forging global relationships. 
Capability, legitimacy, and credibility are considered imperative leadership 
prerequisites (Parker and Karlsson 2010), yet a range of (overlapping) categories for 
evaluating leadership have been developed in the literature (Grubb and Gupta 2000). 
Young (1991) identifies structural, entrepreneurial, and intellectual elements of 
leadership, while Underdal (1994) distinguishes between unilateral, coercive, and 
instrumental leaders. Malnes (1995) focuses on “threats and offers” leadership, 
problem-solving leadership, and directional leadership, while Andresen and Agrawala 
(2002) expand the analytical focus by considering intellectual, instrumental, power-
based, and directional modes of leadership. 
Each typology mentioned above was developed to address different regimes—
for instance, climate change or disarmament negotiations. Consequently, each needs to 
be “adapted to the characteristics of the issues being negotiated” (Grubb and Gupta 
2000, 19). Most typologies highlight capacity-related aspects of leadership, the ability of 
actors to demonstrate the feasibility of alternative courses of actions, and their ability to 
effectively employ negotiation tactics, such as coalition-building. Here we utilize the 
typology of Papa and Gleason (2012), because it draws on all of the aforementioned 
frameworks, allowing for a better understanding of the leadership potential of Brazil in 
the area of global biofuels development. The following paragraphs further unpack three 
dimensions of this typology: policy-based, structural, and instrumental leadership. 
The first element of Papa and Gleason’s typology is policy-based leadership: the 
ability of actors to “frame problems, promote particular policy solutions and implement 
them” (2012, 917). It amalgamates intellectual and directional modes of leadership, 
considering actors’ abilities to provide vision and goals, as well as their determination 
to pioneer alternative policy solutions that demonstrate (through domestic 
implementation) feasibility, value, and superiority, thereby providing a model for others 
to emulate (Grubb and Gupta 2000; Underdal 1994). Such “demonstration effects,” or 
leading by example (Karlsson et al. 2011, 92), constitute an important soft-power tactic 
5 
 
that Brazil has been noted to use in the biofuels context (Afionis and Stringer 2014). 
Policy-based leadership for Brazil in this study therefore refers to its ability to instill the 
desirability of integrating biofuels into other actors’ energy mixes. Disseminating vision 
internationally rests critically upon demonstrating vision domestically. Consequently, 
high policy-based leadership potential is not only reflected in past credentials; equally 
important, Brazil must demonstrate an ongoing commitment to a certain domestic 
policy solution that has worked or is working well. 
The second element of the typology is structural leadership. This concerns an 
actor’s capacity to take actions or deploy material and immaterial power resources that 
can incentivize, plus create costs and benefits, in a particular issue area (Karlsson et al. 
2011). As Grubb and Gupta (2000) note, this type of leadership is a function of an 
actor’s aggregate power—that is, its political strength in the global order, plus its 
weight with respect to the problem. The latter dimension is salient because power tends 
to be “issue-specific” and related to capability within a particular environmental policy 
domain. Altruism is not a prerequisite, but while the leader is seeking to satisfy its own 
objectives (Malnes 1995), it must also demonstrate consideration of others’ concerns if 
durable joint initiatives are to emerge (Papa and Gleason 2012). In our study, high 
structural leadership potential depends on whether Brazil has the resources and will to 
deliver on its pledges to assist African nations with developing their biofuels markets in 
a socially, environmentally, and economically sustainable fashion. 
Finally, instrumental leadership refers to the ability of an actor to use diplomatic 
skills to pursue issue linkages and to engineer winning coalitions (Papa and Gleason 
2012). While coalition formation is important, maintaining and further developing these 
relationships is equally vital. Reliance upon integrative rather than distributive 
bargaining is imperative, for the leader needs to construct mutually beneficial solutions 
(Gupta and Ringius 2001). High instrumental leadership potential, hence, depends on 
the ability of an actor to deepen cooperation within the coalition and attract new allies 
(Papa and Gleason 2012). In this study, Brazil’s ability to display instrumental 
leadership rests on whether it can successfully forge coalitions with other countries. 
 
Brazil’s Ethanol Diplomacy in Africa 
Although Brazil’s efforts to establish financial, political, and cultural relations in 
Africa date back to the 1960s, its prolonged economic rigidity did not allow tangible 
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outcomes to be generated until recently. Capitalizing on a golden decade of economic 
growth coinciding with the beginning of the century, Brazil is now making a concerted 
effort to engage with Africa and enhance its own investment capacity and commercial 
presence, as well as its strategic and political weight. Such inroads have not passed 
unnoticed, with Brazil’s increasing visibility as an international development actor 
being under close international scrutiny (Pierri 2013). 
Two main narratives can be identified in the literature on Brazil’s South-South 
engagement. First is Brazil’s official discourse, which stresses the unconditional nature 
of its development assistance (see ABC 2010; Banco Mundial e Ipea 2011). 
Underpinning the governmental rhetoric is an idealization of the way in which Brazil is 
acting in Africa, stressing solidarity, respect for the counterpart’s sovereignty, and no 
development aid conditionality. Compatibility is often highlighted here—that is, that 
Brazil’s own development experiences are similar to those of African countries, thus 
allowing the former to offer the latter tried and tested solutions (Cabral et al. 2013). 
Biofuels promotion in Africa is also underpinned by normative aspirations, with Brazil 
putting forward the potential of this energy source to spur development. 
The second narrative offers a more negative perspective, viewing Brazil’s 
attachment to Africa as a new form of colonialism. By advancing the interests of African 
and Brazilian entrepreneurs at the expense of, for example, African smallholders, 
Brazil’s South-South cooperation is dismissed as yet another manifestation of the 
exploitation of poor nations by more affluent ones (Clements and Fernandes 2013; 
Thaler 2013). Adopting a softer approach, Lima (2005) emphasizes the instrumental 
role of South-South cooperation in maintaining and further advancing Brazil’s own 
socioeconomic development via the promotion of its domestic capital in global markets. 
Regarding biofuels, when Brazil offers developmental support, commercial agents along 
the entire sugarcane-ethanol supply chain are intentionally involved from the outset. 
This sets it apart from US and EU approaches, which rely on donor-led support and 
refrain from linking commercial activities with development aid (White 2013). 
The Brazilian government has employed an array of tactics in promoting the 
production and use of biofuels in Africa. It has made extensive use of presidential 
diplomacy, especially during the term of President Lula (2003–2010), who visited 
twenty-nine African countries, signing agreements relating to biofuels along the way 
(Amorim 2010). The selection of countries was exploratory, with no coherent pattern; 
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in almost all visits, Brazil would offer its help and, if the hosts expressed interest, a 
memorandum of understanding (MoU) would be signed.5 This explains why Brazil has 
agreements on biofuels with countries ranging from Egypt to South Africa, and from 
Liberia to Kenya. As of September 2015, ten of Brazil’s fourteen cooperation agreements 
on biofuels or bioenergy with African countries, mostly in the western and southern 
sub-Saharan regions, had been concluded during President Lula’s administration.6 
Brazil has also increasingly entered into trilateral cooperation, involving African 
countries plus a Northern donor, with the intention of developing bioenergy projects. At 
the initiative of Brazil, tripartite undertakings involving the EU were agreed with 
Mozambique and Kenya (Afionis and Stringer 2014). Similarly, in 2007 an MoU on 
biofuels cooperation was signed between Brazil and the US, with a subset of the 
activities envisaged being directed toward stimulating private-sector biofuels 
investment in third countries. The initial focus was solely on Central American and 
Caribbean countries, but later it expanded to include African countries like Senegal and 
Guinea-Bissau (Dalgaard 2012). 
 
Brazil’s Bilateral Path 
Despite the potential, bioenergy development in Africa is largely still in its 
infancy, due to limited capacity, food security concerns, and inadequate infrastructure. 
With a few exceptions (e.g., Malawi), African countries have only recently begun to 
introduce policies to leverage biofuel production. Policy development has largely 
focused on promulgating laws and regulatory mechanisms for compulsory minimum 
percentages of ethanol and biodiesel in national oil distribution circuits. Brazil is eager 
to further stimulate this trend, because legal clarity is a sine qua non prerequisite for 
attracting investments. 
 
Progress on the Ground: Brazilian Private-Sector Investments 
Brazil’s private sector is behind several undertakings to enhance local refining 
capacities in Africa. In Malawi and Zimbabwe, Brazil’s private sector has provided 
                                                          
5 Interview #54. 
6 Bilateral agreements on agricultural cooperation with African countries follow a similar geographical as 
well as numerical pattern, with more than three-quarters of the twenty total agreements having been 
promulgated during President Lula’s term. See http://dai-mre.serpro.gov.br/. 
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expertise for the construction of ethanol processing plants,7 while in Mozambique 
Brazilian companies Petrobras and Guaraní have acquired Cia de Sena, a local sugar 
production facility, and are exploring the viability of constructing a distillery. However, 
the investment required to modernize the mill is viewed as prohibitive, with Petrobras 
reportedly regretting buying “a piece of a museum.”8 In Sudan, Brazilian equipment and 
machinery were imported by local company Kenana, which, together with Brazilian firm 
Dedini, built a biofuels plant that has met with considerable success. Sudan has been 
portrayed as a model of sustainable biofuels production by Brazilian policy-makers, due 
to development of an infrastructure that is said to have led to job creation, enhanced 
food production, plus local and regional development.9 
Finally, in Angola, Odebrecht teamed up with local companies, like Damer and 
Sonangol, to build several ethanol plants,10 the first of which initiated operations during 
2014.11 In 2015, however, Odebrecht was convicted by a Brazilian labor court of holding 
Brazilian laborers, who had been illegally imported to Angola to work on the plant’s 
construction, in conditions akin to slavery (Reuters 2015). Odebrecht announced it 
would appeal the decision on the grounds that the project was implemented by third-
party contractors in accordance with both Angolan and Brazilian law.12 
It is notable that Brazil has intentionally sought (through MoUs) to stimulate 
technology transfer and weave the private sector into its ethanol diplomacy processes. 
Dalgaard (2012, 196) notes that this “formula of public-private partnership” is central 
to Brazil’s energy statecraft, given the influence and expertise of its agribusiness sector. 
While MoUs and other agreements are crucial to strengthening biofuel collaboration in 
terms of technical or policy implementation, actual technology transfers are largely 
executed by the private sector. Hence, visits to Brazil by developing country delegations 
regularly include a stopover in São Paulo for consultations with the region’s highly 
influential sugarcane industry.13 However, when it comes to ethanol diplomacy, one 
cannot study it using bilateral agreements alone, since biofuel investments in Africa can 
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8 Interview #41. 
9 Interview #10. 
10 Interview #2. 
11 Interview #25. 
12 Interview #44. 
13 Interview #28. 
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also occur in the absence of official government-to-government arrangements. For 
example, Sudan is one of only two countries in Africa (the other being Angola) where 
concrete biofuel projects have been implemented so far (by Brazilian companies). 
However, when Dedini built Kenana’s ethanol plant, Brazil and Sudan did not have an 
MoU in place. 
 
Brazilian Public-Sector Involvement 
Turning to the public sector, Brazil has aimed to attract private investment, 
mainly via conducting feasibility studies in African countries. Such studies are provided 
at no cost to the African governments that request them and review the prevailing 
environments for project development in biodiesel, ethanol, steam, electricity, and food 
production. African governments then decide whether or not to push forward with the 
recommended projects.14 This is a manifestation of Brazil’s structural power 
capabilities, and is significant in terms of exerting instrumental leadership through 
coalition-building. 
While eager to promote biofuels, Brazil is well aware of the bottlenecks posed by 
highly contentious international debates related to energy and food security, trade, and 
climate change mitigation (Afionis and Stringer 2014). Consequently, Brazil adapted its 
structural leadership with respect to the promotion of sugarcane-ethanol systems, 
conditioning the establishment of sugarcane plantations for ethanol production on the 
proviso that they go hand in hand with productivity gains in food crops, and that they 
only take place in countries endowed with sufficient arable land.15 Nevertheless, as the 
Senegalese case study discussed below illustrates, the ability of feasibility studies to 
assess the viability of producing biofuels in an environmentally, socially, and 
economically sustainable fashion has not escaped criticism. 
Until recently, all feasibility studies in Africa had been conducted by the Getúlio 
Vargas Foundation (Fundação Getúlio Vargas—FGV)16 and were meant to serve as tools 
for attracting international investment attention to the recommended projects. 
However, in 2013 a lack of tangible results prompted the Brazilian government, through 
the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), to try a “fresh approach,” by hiring US 
                                                          
14 Interview #14. 
15 Interview #25. 
16 FGV is a higher education institution with a strong consultancy profile. 
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consulting firm Bain & Company to conduct feasibility studies in the eight-nation 
Economic and Monetary Union of West Africa (UEMOA). Bain’s final recommendations 
were for the UEMOA countries to replicate the Brazilian model, investing in sugar 
production first, followed by the production of electricity and ethanol.17 
To date, feasibility studies have identified Tanzania, Senegal, Zambia, and 
Mozambique as the most promising locales for biofuels.18 However, progress has been 
slow, and none of the feasibility studies have led to actual project commencement. 
Mozambique has attracted Brazil’s utmost attention, given the common language, 
favorable climate, low population density, and its perceived land availability. While 
Mozambique’s 2009 biofuels strategy articulated a blending mandate of inter alia 10 
percent for ethanol by 2015, field research revealed that, at present, there is no 
blending of biofuels with petrol or diesel, and production of biofuels is negligible. 
Indeed, of the thirty-seven biofuel-related projects that had applied for licenses 
between 2008 and 2014, only five were operational, and all remained in the pilot 
phase.19 The failure of these early biofuels projects is likely to have impacted negatively 
on the government’s resolve to promote biofuels, while the recent discovery of massive 
fossil fuel reserves off its coast was perceived to have further dampened enthusiasm for 
biofuels.20 
While Mozambique-based Brazilian interviewees expressed their confidence that 
the country would eventually develop biofuels, such optimism was not shared by 
Mozambique’s sugar sector. They cited the lack of (domestic) markets, a competitive 
investment climate, and legislation as barriers to biofuel investment.21 Even so, Brazil 
has made a concentrated effort to assist Mozambique with developing its own biofuels 
program and market, with MoUs on biofuels development and renewable energy being 
signed in 2007 and 2015, respectively. Despite the centrality of Mozambique to Brazil’s 
ethanol diplomacy vision, government-to-government technical knowledge transfer has 
been rather limited. Although Brazil offered its help to the Mozambicans, the latter 
never really took bilateral cooperation to the next level. According to the Mozambican 
                                                          
17 Interview #26. 
18 Interview #14. 
19 Interview #42. 
20 Interviews #34, 40, and 48. 
21 Interviews #40 and 41. 
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Ministry of Energy, the 2007 MoU mainly focused on the exchange of ideas and on 
shaping policies, which had included study tours to visit ethanol-related institutions and 
companies in Brazil.22 
Mozambicans justified their disinclination to proceed further in terms of 
skepticism as to whether the different social, political, and environmental contexts 
allowed for Brazil’s experience to be directly replicated in Mozambique.23 For instance, 
food security concerns were central, prompting Mozambique to seek the assistance of 
the Dutch in developing its biofuels sustainability framework (see NL Agency 2014). For 
Brazil, this lack of technical interactions was a disappointing turn of events, with 
concerns being raised that in the absence of adequate infrastructure and laboratories, 
the Mozambican standards were “too rigid for [the country’s] level of development.”24 
However, Brazil’s advice has been sought on some issues, such as whether to have a 
minimum-price policy for ethanol or to attach ethanol remuneration from gasoline in 
the international market as a parameter. Mozambique’s draft pricing structure was also 
sent to the Brazilian government for review.25 
 
Brazil’s Trilateral Path 
In addition to bilateral arrangements, Brazil has augmented its instrumental 
leadership by developing trilateral cooperation arrangements, whereby it provides 
assistance alongside a Northern codonor to a beneficiary country. Building coalition 
networks with prominent actors in the biofuels arena serves instrumental purposes if 
Brazil is to achieve its goal of commoditizing ethanol. Under the 2007 MoU with the US, 
feasibility studies were carried out by FGV in Guinea-Bissau and Senegal. While the 
former was never officially presented, because soon after its completion the country 
experienced a coup, the latter proceeded as planned and outlined the advantages of 
projects for sugarcane, cottonseed oil, sunflower, and soybean oil. Ethanol from 
sugarcane and biodiesel from cotton attracted the attention of Senegalese policy-
                                                          
22 Interview #37. 
23 Interviews #36 and 37. 
24 Interview #41. 
25 Interview #37. 
12 
 
makers, with further project development awaiting governmental approval of the 
regulatory framework.26 
A note of caution is warranted, however, as a review by the UN Environment 
Programme (UNEP) of FGV’s 2010 Senegalese feasibility study raised concerns about 
whether all pillars of sustainable development had been assessed equally. In addition to 
concerns that the study adopted a desk study approach with a two-week field trip, 
UNEP’s review also questioned the rationale behind some of the proposed projects. For 
instance, although enhancing sugarcane production in one region of Senegal was 
highlighted as feasible, the region faces severe water shortages that might otherwise 
have led to it being declared unfit for production.27 UNEP concluded that while the FGV 
study served as “a great tool” for the private sector to identify investment opportunities, 
it was less well designed to support policy-makers in devising adequately sustainable 
strategies and policies.28 
Turning to the EU, the current legal and political framework for bilateral 
relations with Brazil is the strategic partnership agreement, established in 2007 at the 
initiative of the EU Portuguese presidency. Under the auspices of this interregional 
collaborative undertaking, during the third EU-Brazil Summit in Stockholm in 2009, it 
was decided to set up joint trilateral projects for bioenergy and ethanol production in 
Africa, with Kenya and Mozambique as pilot countries. Brazil would lead on the 
Mozambican project, and the EU on Kenya. The selection of these two countries was 
based on technical and political factors. Starting with the former factor, Brazil was in 
favor of countries with soil and climatic conditions favorable to large-scale sugarcane 
cultivation—that is, the crop with which it has transferable expertise. Turning to the 
latter, the main criterion was domestic political stability, since both countries had 
secure democratic governments that the EU and Brazil “could trust.”29 
The agreements to initiate these trilateral cooperative endeavors between Africa, 
the EU, and Brazil have been reported in the literature, but so far no evaluation has been 
undertaken of how they have translated into practice. For instance, Franco et al. (2010) 
note that high EU tariffs on Brazilian ethanol imports have partly stimulated the joint 
                                                          
26 Interviews #10, 28, 29, 33, and 51. 
27 Interview #53. 
28 Interview #53.  
29 Interview #54.  
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EU-Brazil decision to establish production in third countries, and thus to engage in 
biofuels and bioelectricity projects in Mozambique. Bypassing the debate on tariffs and 
securing preferential access to EU markets has been also cited by Amanor (2013) as the 
raison d'être behind these trilateral endeavors. Thaler (2013, 151) further highlights 
Brazil’s “heavy dose of self-interest” in the decision to table plans for trilateral 
cooperation with the EU. The above debate is consistent with observations that altruism 
is not a prerequisite for exerting leadership (Malnes 1995). Our interviews with 
relevant stakeholders, nevertheless, demonstrate that trilateral cooperation in both 
Kenya and Mozambique failed to progress beyond wishful thinking. 
In the case of Kenya, initial discussions took place between the Brazilian 
embassy and the EU delegation to Kenya in 2010. These indicated a divergence in terms 
of the desired policy outcomes from the project. While both actors stressed the need to 
assist Kenya in promulgating a regulatory framework that would provide for 
sustainable policies, the EU was skeptical of Brazil’s drive for market expansion and 
creation of investment opportunities in the country.30 The EU also lacked an 
institutional mechanism for cofinancing trilateral cooperative undertakings in Kenya 
that involved private-sector investments in biofuels. One interviewee indicated that at 
the summitry level, focus had been on the political and strategic benefits of cooperation, 
with the implementation aspect having being overlooked.31 Parallel cofinancing, 
whereby actions are broken down into clearly identifiable subactions, each funded by a 
different cofinancing partner, was eventually pinpointed as a solution. 
In 2011, the EU Kenyan delegation decided to proceed by proposing to DG 
DEVCO (the Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation) a scoping study to 
identify relevant initiatives that had already been implemented in Kenya, what 
regulations were already in place, and what kind of support—and in which areas—the 
country would require as assistance. At this point, the process halted.32 With the tide 
turning increasingly against biofuels as a sustainably sound energy option, the trilateral 
undertaking in Kenya fell out of favor with EU headquarters in Brussels, which ceased 
considering this project a priority and repeatedly delayed authorizing the EU delegation 
in Kenya to proceed. When the Brazilian embassy in Kenya enquired about the state of 
                                                          
30 Interviews #9 and 22.  
31 Interview #22.  
32 Interview #22.  
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progress, it was suggested that their headquarters speak directly with Brussels, which 
resulted in an inconclusive reply of “we are looking into it.”33 As of July 2015, no further 
action has been undertaken, indicating unwillingness on the part of the EU to be further 
associated with this project. 
Turning to Mozambique, the local EU delegation and the Brazilian embassy 
initially discussed the terms of reference for a Brazilian-led study that would analyze 
biofuels production in the country and serve as a prefeasibility study for potential 
investments. The EU stressed the need to take into account land grabbing and food 
security concerns, alongside the involvement of local farmers in the production of 
feedstock, plus Mozambican small- and medium-sized enterprises in the processing part 
of the value chain.34 As with Kenya, the EU delegation highlighted a lack of specific 
financial instruments to partner with the Brazilians to cofinance trilateral undertakings 
in Mozambique. 
Discussions, however, did not progress further, because the EU was informed 
that the Brazilian company Vale would provide the funds for the FGV to carry out the 
feasibility study.35 For the EU, this represented a potential conflict of interest, as Vale’s 
portfolio included biofuels and the company had already expressed interest in 
diversifying its operations into Africa. Consequently, complications could not be ruled 
out, especially since private and public funds were combined through the same channel 
to finance activities aimed in principle at advancing Mozambican public wellbeing.36 
Brazil’s retort was that apart from ownership of the report remaining with its 
government, the sheer costs involved in undertaking the study (≈US $1 million) 
necessitated private-sector involvement.37 Eventually, Brazil proceeded alone (with 
Vale input) to produce the feasibility study, and currently it is analyzing what private-
sector actors could be involved in its operationalization. The EU received a copy of the 
final feasibility study but was not requested to formally comment. Consequently, the EU 
is not officially associated with this output.38 
 
                                                          
33 Interview #18.  
34 Interview #21.  
35 Interview #21.  
36 Interview #21.  
37 Interview #18.  
38 Interviews #21, 35, and 40.  
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Implementation Barriers 
Unlike in Brazil’s ethanol diplomacy endeavors in Latin America, the low level of 
agricultural technology, lack of infrastructure, and political instability were cited as 
prime complications for scaling up biofuels production in Africa.39 In most African 
countries the level of agricultural development is relatively poor and based 
predominantly on complex and contested customary land rights, as well as on 
smallholders that frequently switch crops and are not organized in cooperatives.40 Lack 
of capital, infrastructure, skilled labor, and legal and regulatory frameworks further 
drive market and investor uncertainty.41 Limited local research and development is also 
important, given that the local varieties of sugarcane differ from those in Brazil.42 
Unstable political conditions greatly hinder investments, as Brazilian funding 
institutions, like BNDES, face difficulties covering the requirements and mitigation costs 
linked to dynamics such as currency fluctuations.43 Civil wars, like that in Guinea-
Bissau, are also a deterrent to investors. A Brazilian delegation visited Mali in 2012 to 
discuss biofuels cooperation, only to hastily evacuate the country due to insurgency in 
the north.44 Unforeseen events were also highlighted, with Bain, for instance, 
postponing plans to present its study findings to the UEMOA country governments 
during the summer of 2014 due to the Ebola virus epidemic.45 However, one of the most 
important barriers relates to the heated debate over biofuels’ sustainability that ignited 
in the late 2000s and led many African governments to shift away from biofuels.46 The 
unexpected slump in oil prices of more than 50 percent since mid-2014, the longest-
running decline for 20 years, even further deterred many African countries from 
considering biofuel investments in the near term. 
 
Discussion 
Policy-Based Leadership 
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40 Interview #46. 
41 Interview #39. 
42 Interview #15. 
43 Interview #4. 
44 Interview #29. 
45 Interview #28. 
46 Interview #54. 
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Having outlined Brazil’s bilateral and trilateral undertakings in Africa, in this 
section we link back to the theoretical framework, to assess the extent to which Brazil 
has been able to exert leadership in promoting biofuels abroad. Brazil has clearly 
demonstrated policy-based leadership, by unilaterally setting an example through the 
implementation of the world's largest and most sophisticated biomass-to-energy 
program. During the 2000s, Brazil was effectively the poster child of ethanol fuel, but 
due to a combination of factors discussed below, the Brazilian sugarcane sector has 
recently plunged into crisis. Consequently, even Brazil has experienced a dampening of 
enthusiasm for biofuels, and this has led to challenges in promoting its vision and 
direction. 
First, dry climatic conditions, coupled with poor plantation management and 
planning decisions, effectively crippled ethanol production in Brazil during the early 
2010s, fueling market uncertainty, driving ethanol prices up, and forcing the 
importation of ethanol from the US in 2011 (Angelo 2012). Second, international and 
domestic economic developments have affected Brazilian biofuel production. The global 
economic crisis emerged when the Brazilian sugarcane sector was export-oriented and 
engaging in new investments to grow its way out of deep debt. The turmoil that ensued 
effectively halted domestic ethanol production expansion plans, with the sector 
resorting to harvesting cane from older, less productive sites instead of developing new 
plantations (Angelo 2012). Reduced average yields were exacerbated by the 
unfavorable climatic conditions, culminating in an ethanol supply crisis that left the 
sector in disarray. 
Domestic politics were not conducive, either, with President Rousseff’s policies 
being blamed as a main culprit for the prolonged period of upheaval that plagued the 
sugarcane sector. Brazilian interviewees argued that biofuels are not a priority policy 
area for Rousseff’s administration, which accords far greater attention to the oilfields 
that were discovered off the Brazilian coast during the late 2000s.47 Indicative of the 
reduced priority assigned to biofuels is the rapidity with which they have been 
subjugated in order to tackle more pressing and immediate concerns. In particular, 
President Rousseff’s decisions to control inflation by capping petrol and diesel prices, 
and by cutting taxes on petrol but not ethanol, spelled a major competitive setback for 
                                                          
47 Interviews #24, 27, 29, 30, 31, 49, and 54. 
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the ethanol sector.48 Precipitously low international sugar prices further complicated 
the situation, with 10 percent of the Brazilian sugarcane sector suspending its 
operations during the 2014 growing season to safeguard against losses.49 
A lack of domestic strategy and vision has resulted in the future direction of 
ethanol as an energy option in Brazil being increasingly debated.50 While several 
interviewees expected little policy change following President Rousseff’s reelection for 
a second term in October 2014, she subsequently took action that was received 
positively by the sugarcane-ethanol sector. Ranking highest in importance was the 
decision to increase significantly the taxes on fossil fuels, as well as the communication 
of Brazil’s ambitious climate change pledge for 2030 ahead of the December 2015 Paris 
summit.51 Interviewees, however, were quick to downplay the extent to which these 
developments should be perceived as indicative of steps toward (re)assuming a policy-
based leadership position. Increases in fossil fuel taxes were unanimously seen as a 
revenue-raising device to reduce the country’s budget deficit, while the pledge to 
increase the share of sustainable biofuels in the Brazilian energy mix to approximately 
18 percent by 2030 was largely expected, as Brazil needed “to have something to 
show.”52 Concrete steps toward implementation of the pledge will probably be 
undertaken by future administrations. President Rousseff’s overriding near-term 
priority will be to continue in power and avoid impeachment over allegations that she 
disguised a widening fiscal deficit as she campaigned for reelection.53 
Inevitably, Brazil’s ethanol diplomacy has been impacted by this domestic 
standstill. While some interviewees noted that ethanol diplomacy has now retracted 
into a lower-priority issue, others argued that it had gradually died off in the aftermath 
of President Rousseff’s ascendance to power. She was regularly portrayed as a fossil-
fuel-oriented person with strong ties to the oil industry, disinclined to follow in 
President Lula’s footsteps when it came to promoting ethanol abroad. For instance, Casa 
Civil’s54 staff dedicated to ethanol diplomacy affairs under the Lula administration was 
                                                          
48 Interview #27. 
49 Interview #27. 
50 Interviews #13, 24, 27, 29, and 30. 
51 Interviews #47, 48, and 49. 
52 Interviews #43, 46, 48, and 49. 
53 Interviews #44 and 49.  
54 The Executive Office of the President of Brazil. 
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reassigned to other duties,55 with  ethanol diplomacy left in the hands of ministry-level 
bureaucrats who have attempted to keep it afloat in the absence of positive presidential 
leadership, vision, and coordination.56 In terms of policy-based leadership, Brazil has 
not been sending positive signals to the countries where it wants to promote biofuels, 
leading to messages that can be problematic and confusing. Brazil’s struggle to 
conceptualize its domestic vision with respect to biofuels has caused suspicion among 
some African partners,57 and if this remains unchecked, it could taint Brazil’s credibility 
as a global biofuel leader. Following that, a reconceptualization of Brazil’s international 
vision might also be warranted, as indicated by our Mozambican case study findings. 
 
Structural Leadership 
Even though its political strength in the global order is only a fraction of, for 
example, China’s, Brazil still has the resources and scientific expertise required to 
successfully pursue biofuels abroad. This was especially true for Lula’s administration, 
which supported key ethanol diplomacy actors—for instance, the Brazilian Cooperation 
Agency—with sizable budgetary increases.58 As one interviewee noted, “if you needed 
to go to Africa, Europe or Asia two times a month, he would give you the money to do 
it.”59 However, a note of caution is necessary here. Despite the allocation of significant 
resources, the leadership task at hand was viewed by Brazil’s policy circles at the time 
as greatly exceeding the country’s human and financial structural capabilities. 
Complaints were often voiced in ministries that “every time Lula comes back, we have 
another MoU.”60 Additionally, handling an ever-increasing influx of foreign delegations 
made heavy demands on the available resources: “We received five or six delegations a 
month. It was too much, we were overwhelmed. Our staff on renewables . . . was only 
about six people.”61 
Under the Rousseff administration, Brazil’s economic outlook has darkened 
considerably, with inter alia falling domestic demand, high inflation, and deteriorating 
                                                          
55 Interview #54. 
56 Interviews #24, 26, 27, 28, 29, and 30.   
57 Interview #27. 
58 Interviews #50 and 54.  
59 Interview #48. 
60 Anonymous interview. 
61 Interview #48. 
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investor confidence having pushed the country to the brink of recession.62 
Consequently, Brazil’s aid budget has been massively reduced, such that technical 
cooperation assistance requests from (particularly) African countries have been 
declined.63 The Ministry of Agriculture’s overall budget for cooperation has been more 
than halved, constraining its ability to pursue projects on biofuels in Brazil that could 
potentially be extended to Africa.64 Another interviewee noted that nowadays they 
simply respond to requests for assistance, whereas in the past they had been far more 
proactive.65 
Budgetary constraints have also impacted capacity-building and dissemination 
activities, primarily toward African and Latin American countries. In 2008 the Brazilian 
Agricultural Research Cooperation (Embrapa) set up permanent offices in Accra, Ghana, 
to tackle in a more systematic manner the continuous flow of requests from African 
countries interested in Brazil’s technical expertise in tropical agriculture. However, this 
bureau is underfunded and understaffed, prompting one interviewee to dismiss it as a 
public relations exercise.66 Furthermore, the hosting of the 2013 Bioenergy Week in 
Brasilia was only possible because it was organized under the auspices of the Global 
Bioenergy Partnership (GBEP) and sponsored by, inter alia, the US and the Organization 
of American States.67 Similar events, such as the São Paulo Ethanol Weeks of 2008 and 
2009, had been financed primarily by the Brazilian government, but were subsequently 
discontinued due to budgetary issues.68 Consequently, ministries eager to spearhead 
such events need to “diversify and be creative” to secure funding, relying on 
partnerships with international initiatives like GBEP, intergovernmental organizations, 
and private-sector actors.69 
A final point regarding structural leadership concerns Brazil’s sugarcane 
industry sector, a key (financial) government ally when it comes to ethanol diplomacy. 
Although bilateral cooperation is supported by government diplomacy, it is 
                                                          
62 The Economist, December 1, 2015. 
63 Interviews #50 and 54.  
64 Interview #27. 
65 Interview #29. 
66 Interview #30. 
67 Interview #27. 
68 Interview #27. 
69 Interview #28. 
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implemented by the private sector. Successful ethanol diplomacy therefore presupposes 
a healthy sugarcane industry. However, domestic constraints mean that for the past few 
years the industry has been operating at a loss, current conditions thereby largely ruling 
out pursuing investment opportunities abroad.70 Overall, Brazil is drawing heavily on its 
past track record with regard to its structural leadership credentials, which remain 
threatened by funding cuts and an ailing private sector. 
 
Instrumental Leadership 
In closing, Brazil’s record of instrumental leadership has been mixed, 
characterized by the dynamics of its coalition network. Several highly ambitious 
projects have floundered, with those in Ghana and Tanzania serving as examples. In the 
former, although plans by Odebrecht in 2010 to build an ethanol plant had secured 
financial approval by BNDES, the project was not implemented when one of its 
Ghanaian partners went bankrupt.71 Tanzania had been earmarked by Brazilian policy-
makers as possessing great potential for biofuels production.72 Following requests for 
assistance, Brazil initiated an FGV-led feasibility study in the Rufiji valley. In addition, 
Petrobras was to carry out a viability study for blending, with an MoU to this effect 
signed during President Lula’s visit to Tanzania in 2010. The FGV study remained at 
draft stage, while the Petrobras one was completed—indicating potential for up to 9-
percent blends—but preliminary tests were never carried out. The stalemate was 
largely attributed to a loss of interest on the part of Tanzania’s government, due to the 
concurrent discovery of vast offshore natural gas deposits.73 
Setbacks aside, Brazil’s direct presence in Africa is currently limited to a handful 
of countries (Mozambique, Angola, and Sudan), while a few others, like Zimbabwe and 
Malawi, have accessed Brazil’s expertise in the construction of ethanol-processing 
plants. The overall results have been meager at best, with Mozambique, Brazil’s flagship 
ethanol diplomacy endeavor, serving as an illustrative example. In addition, FGV’s 
feasibility studies have not yet led to concrete results, and the same is true for many 
MoUs signed with various African countries. Only 10–20 percent of the more than 
                                                          
70 Interviews #23 and 48. 
71 Interview #28. 
72 Interview #14. 
73 Interview #23. 
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seventy MoUs negotiated by Brazil with countries worldwide have actually led to active 
cooperation.74 
While engagement with Africa to date may not have lived up to expectations, 
recent years have seen some renewed effort on the part of Brazil to stimulate ethanol 
diplomacy undertakings, as evidenced, for example, by the 2013 BNDES decision to 
invest in Bain’s feasibility studies in West Africa. Moving from a national to a regional 
focus was seen as a way of taking things forward, with the partnership with GBEP 
envisaged as another tool in facilitating this transition. The 2013 Bioenergy Week in 
Brasilia, as well as its sequel in Maputo, Mozambique, in May 2014, allowed Brazil to 
network with Latin American and African countries.75 In May 2015, Brazil again relied 
on its partnership with GBEP to organize a similar event in Asia, held in Medan, 
Indonesia. 
Turning to trilateral cooperation, while Brazil has put in place an expansive 
alliance with the US, it has struggled to form a lasting and viable coalition with the EU 
due to the latter’s sustainability concerns. Although we do not dismiss the basic values 
(e.g., environmental) underlying the EU’s approach toward biofuels, an interest-based 
perspective could help provide a more complete understanding of how an actor’s 
preferences concerning international environmental cooperation are shaped. In this 
regard, our research suggests that the EU was skeptical about being part of projects that 
would benefit Brazil’s long-term commercial interests. The objective of the EU was not 
to finance business opportunities for Brazil76 or to contribute to the development of an 
international biofuels market under Brazil’s leadership.77 While the EU welcomed any 
Brazilian biofuel-related activities that could realize sustainable benefits for African 
people, it was not inclined to fund them. As one EU official explained, “Brazil will go on 
and search for other partners, but the EU is not getting on this train.”78 
An important finding emerging from our study concerns the perceived difficulty 
faced by Brazilian policy-makers when trying to interact and cooperate with their EU 
counterparts. In trilateral cooperation endeavors, the expressed feeling was that “we 
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77 Interview #22.  
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22 
 
talk, we talk, but we don’t go for concrete actions.”79 Brazilian policy-makers in Brussels 
argued that DG DEVCO, which is the provider of funds for development cooperation, 
blocked biofuel undertakings in Africa on sustainability grounds.80 This was 
nevertheless deemed confusing, since other DGs were engaged in biofuel cooperation 
with Brazil on other fronts.81 Interviewees drew parallels with the trilateral biofuel 
undertakings in Africa, Central America, and the Caribbean that involved the US as a 
codonor. The view was that the US “is more proactive, we see a clear intention to go to 
the next step: implementation.”82 Consequently, various projects and dissemination 
activities are taking place in the aforementioned regions, albeit not at great scale.83 
 
Conclusions 
In this study we examined Brazil’s potential to exert leadership through its 
bilateral and trilateral efforts to promote biofuels in Africa. Apart from the notable 
exceptions of Angola and Sudan, the bilateral avenue has barely moved beyond political 
deliberations and feasibility studies, while the trilateral approach involving the EU has 
struggled to get off the ground. In terms of Brazil’s leadership potential, an evaluation of 
Brazil’s bilateral and trilateral undertakings in Africa demonstrated that in terms of 
policy-based leadership, a lack of vision and direction is apparent. Regarding structural 
power, Brazil has the material and scientific resources required, but the domestic 
situation and budget constraints have limited the abilities of public- and private-sector 
actors to engage in biofuel activities abroad. Finally, in terms of instrumental 
leadership, while Brazil has had successes in terms of coalition-building, the EU’s 
disinclination to participate in trilateral biofuel undertakings constrains the reach of 
Brazil’s ethanol diplomacy discourses. 
Brazil’s attempt to exert global leadership has been compromised by the 
significant change in the international perception of biofuels and the dynamics of the 
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81 Interviews #15 and 20.  
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83 Interviews #15 and 20. These activities have predominantly involved workshops and other technical 
knowledge transfer initiatives. Some concrete projects have also been implemented. For example, under 
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global political economy. Although Brazil can do little to alter this, the perplexing 
domestic biofuel policy situation does not send appropriate signals to potential partner 
countries. For Brazil to achieve its global leadership goal in the biofuels arena, a vital 
first step will be the reconsolidation of a domestic vision. Doing so will enable Brazil to 
take advantage of technological innovations in advanced biofuels that could change the 
tide with respect to biofuels in the international scene.84 
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APPENDIX (List of interviews) 
No. Date City Mode Actor 
  1 October 2011 Brussels FtF* Brazilian Delegation to the EU 
  2 February 2013 São Paulo FtF University of São Paulo 
  3 February 2013 São Paulo FtF University of São Paulo 
  4 February 2013 Rio de Janeiro FtF BNDES 
  5 February 2013 Rio de Janeiro FtF CENPES/Petrobras 
  6 February 2013 Rio de Janeiro FtF CENPES/Petrobras 
  7 March 2013 Rio de Janeiro FtF Petrobras Biocombustível 
  8 March 2013 Brasilia FtF EU Delegation to Brazil 
  9 March 2013 Brasilia FtF EU Delegation to Brazil 
10 March 2013 Brasilia FtF Brazilian Ministry of External Relations 
11 March 2013 Brasilia FtF Brazilian Ministry of Environment 
12 March 2013 Brasilia FtF EU Delegation to Brazil 
13 March 2013 Brasilia FtF University of Brasilia 
14 March 2013 Brasilia FtF Brazilian Ministry of Mining & Energy 
15 March 2013 Piracicaba FtF Sugarcane Research Center (CTC) 
16 April 2013 Brussels FtF UNICA 
17 September 2013  Telephone DG Trade 
18 September 2013 Brussels FtF Brazilian Delegation to the EU 
19 October 2013 Brussels FtF DG Energy 
20 October 2013 Brussels FtF UNICA 
21 October 2013  Telephone EU Delegation to Mozambique 
22 October 2013  Telephone EU Delegation to Kenya 
23 July 2014 Dar es Salaam FtF Embassy of Brazil to Tanzania 
24 August 2014 São Paulo FtF University of São Paulo 
25 August 2014 São Paulo FtF FGV 
26 August 2014 Rio de Janeiro FtF BNDES 
27 September 2014 Brasilia FtF Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture 
28 September 2014 Brasilia FtF Brazilian Ministry of External Relations 
29 September 2014 Brasilia FtF Brazilian Ministry of Mining & Energy 
30 September 2014 Brasilia FtF FGV 
31 September 2014 Brasilia FtF EU Delegation to Brazil 
32 September 2014  Telephone GranBio (Alagoas) 
33 September 2014 Brasilia FtF US Embassy to Brazil 
34 May 2015 Maputo FtF Universidade Eduardo Mondlane 
35 May 2015 Maputo FtF EU Delegation to Mozambique 
36 June 2015 Maputo FtF Ministry of Agriculture/Food Security 
37 June 2015 Maputo FtF Ministry of Energy 
38 June 2015 Maputo FtF Sugar estate 
39 June 2015 Maputo FtF Sugar mill 
40 June 2015 Maputo FtF Embassy of Brazil to Mozambique 
41 June 2015  Telephone Energy consultant 
42 June 2015 Maputo FtF Independent Energy consultant 
43 September 2015 São Paulo FtF UNICA 
44 September 2015 São Paulo FtF Odebrecht 
45 September 2015 Campinas FtF CTBE 
46 September 2015 Brasilia FtF Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture 
47 September 2015 Brasilia FtF Brazilian Ministry of External Relations 
48 September 2015 Brasilia FtF Brazilian Ministry of Mining & Energy 
49 September 2015 Brasilia FtF UNICA 
50 September 2015 Brasilia FtF Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) 
51 September 2015 Brasilia FtF US Embassy to Brazil 
52 September 2015 Brasilia FtF EU Delegation to Brazil 
53 September 2015  Email UNEP 
54 October 2015  Telephone Casa Civil 
* Face-to-face. 
 
